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A serious attempt to refute traditional theism is made by Charles
polemicizes that traditional theism is "an incorrect

Hartshorne, He

religious idea into philosophical
writings attempt to show that
categories,"'
theism
is
traditional
self-refuting because of its contradictory
2
affirmations, In language reminiscent of Nietzsche, he suggests it
might be a "hoax of priestcraft.
He proposes a "neo-classical theism" as the only means for
preserving the logic of belief in God.* Some Christian theologians
(notably, John Cobb, Jr., and Schubert Ogden) appeal to
Hartshorne in much the same way as Thomas Aquinas appealed to
Aristotle. Ogden says Hartshorne's panentheism is "perfectly
compatible" with the Bible and is the only means for presenting the
translation of the central

His voluminous

Christian message to the contemporary mind.'
This paper intends in part to assess Hartshorne's interpretation of
traditional theism. It intends also to focus upon the common
concerns of his panentheism and traditional theism, while at the
same time pointing out their possible differences. While the

sympathies of this writer will
prove philosophically that

be

obvious,

no

claim is

being made to

traditional theism is true and that

Hartshorne's neo-theism is false. This paper more modestly intends
to be an analytical interpretation of some aspects of these two theistic

perspectives and pointing out their possible implications for religious
philosophy.
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theology "makes no appeal to revelation,. faith, intuition, mystic
vision, authority, paradox, or any of the devices by which religious
teachers and thinkers exempt their ideas from rational criticism.
For Hartshorne, truth is identical to conceptual clarity. Meta

physical

truth is the abstract

reality

of what is

exemplified in the
intelligible and what is
is
intelligible reality itself. What cannot be known as it essentially is
cannot be real.' If God exists, then His essence must be
rationally
comprehensible and He must be capable of being talked about
literally without resorting to metaphor, equivocation, and paradox.
Especially such metaphors as God is a father should be dropped.^
Hartshorne's attempt at a natural theology is a needed corrective
in protestant theology which labors under the inhibitions of Kant's
dictum that there can be no theoretical proof for God's existence.
However, he fails to see that while a natural theology is in principle a
possibility, in practice it cannot be successful apart from revelation.
Contemporary Thomists insist that protestant theologians have
greatly misunderstood their idea of natural theology. Battista
Mondin particularly shows that Thomistic natural theology is not a
pure natural theology. He shows that Barth's criticism of natural
theology has weight against the deistic philosophers of the eighteenth
century who believed God's existence is provable without recourse to
revelation, but that is not the position of Thomism.'
actual world. Whatever is conceivable is

While the existence of God should be self-evident from

a

contingency
being to account for the fact of its dependent being), in
practice this knowledge is clouded by the distorting influence of evil
upon human perception. Unlike the popular misunderstanding of
Thomism in Protestant circles, Aquinas also taught that every part of
human life has been negatively influenced by evil, including the
ability to reason correctly. E.L. Mascall, a contemporary spokesman
for Thomism, says: "One does not have to be Calvinist to
acknowledge that sin has weakened human reason to see clearly what
of the world

consideration of the

existent

obvious about God's existence. Yet grace
well as the heart to its proper integrity, "lo

should be

mind

as

(which demands a self-

so

restores the

Christian has a higher intelligence than a
he is existentially capable of insight
non-theist,
unavailable to him before. Perception of truth is always more than
intellectual exercise; our perceptions have an affectional dimension
This does not

mean a

but it does

as

mean

well. Mondin writes of the Thomist

position:
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The believer is not endowed with

an extra-power, that the
unbeliever does not possess. What distinguishes the believer
from the unbeliever is faith, and faith is no knowing power,
but a mere habit which gives to the knowing power

previously existing (i.e. to reason) a disposition to accept as
true, and meaningful, what otherwise would be rejected as
false and nonsensical. ' '

The debate between Bertrand Russell and Frederick

Copleston

illustrates this impasse between the theist and the non-theist.
Copleston, a Thomist philosopher, admits their conclusions about
God's existence are different because their "ideas of philosophy are

radically different."'^ It is appropriate and possible to discuss natural
theology with non-theists, but the theist recognizes that natural
theology is successful only from the standpoint of revelation.
Hartshorne's revision of the ontological argument is unconvincing.
Even before Kant, Aquinas argued against the sheer idea of God as
constituting a theistic proof. The reality of God is more than a
question of logic alone. If God exists, it is to be demonstrated upon a
realist perception of truth. That is, the truth of reality is mediated
directly through sensory experience. A realist perception of truth,
while of course it cannot be logically proved, is more able to justify its
postulates about reality than can an idealist perspective. Even the
idealist in practice has to live like a realist.
An idealist interpretation of truth tends to draw deductive,
infallible, absolute conclusions about reality. For example,
Hartshorne asserts that the essence of God is altogether explicable
through modal logic. Such an identification of God with human
reason is staggering even to those theists who are committed to an
idealist perspective. On the other hand, an epistemological reaHst
holds to the twin postulates that reality is mediated directly through
our senses and that it is intelligible to the mind. If God's existence is
to be demonstrated, the mind must perceive that fact through its
experience with extramental reality. If the inner constitutive nature
of being is not given through sensory experiences, then God's
existence cannot be demonstrated. Yet the mind does perceive
through its experience of the contingency of the world that God as a
self-existent Being necessarily exists; otherwise, the world could not
exist. The mind's obvious perception of the dependency of the world
requires an infmite, self-reliant Being as its sustainer and creator. The
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deduction of one
consequence of the inner

not based on the

but it is

a

constitutive nature of the world.'*
Yet a pure natural theology cannot demonstrate God's existence.
Etienne Gilson, who is perhaps the most significant expositor of
Thomas Aquinas in contemporary scholarship, points out that while
Greek thought provided the technique to express "ideas that had
entered the head of any Greek philosopher, "'^ Aristotle had
taken natural theology as far as it could without reaching a true
theistic understanding. Gilson calls it "an unpalatable fact" that the
never

revelation of God to Moses became "an epoch-making statement in
the history of philosophy."'^ He shows that "Plato and Aristotle had
pushed their investigations almost as far as human reason alone can
take

us.

"18

The ultimate

cause

of

things

can

only

be known

as a

standpoint of the Christian revelation. For
way one can discover the true existence of God

God from the

personal
Aquinas, there is no
through reason alone.^o

Gilson shows that after Aquinas had provided the climax in the
history of natural theology, it was almost immediately followed by
an anticlimax. Why? Because metaphysics was divorced from

theology. While the existence of God should be "most obvious,"2i the
fact is
was

no one sees

never

Christian

sophically

it without the aid of revelation. Such a theistic idea
by Greek philosophy. Only from the Judeo-

realized

perspective

does the existence of God become

philo

obvious. Gilson writes:

have not inferred the supreme existentiality
of God from any previous knowledge of the existential
nature of things; on the contrary, the self-revelation of the
of God has helped philosophers toward the

Philosophers
existentiality

realization of the existential

words, philosophers

were

nature

of

not able to

things.

In other

reach, beyond

their very causes,
essences, the existential energies which are
had
taught them that
until the Jewish-Christian Revelation
22
"to be" was the proper name of the Supreme Being.
The
was

reason

why natural theology fell into disrepute, Gilson

because it ceased to be Christian. The

says,

post-sixteenth

natural
a
philosophers (beginning with Descartes) attempted pure
Gilson writes:
theology separated from the Christian religion.
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"Modern

philosophy has been created by laymen, not by churchmen,
and to the ends of the natural cities of men, not the end of the
supernatural city of God. "23
For Thomas Aquinas, the

theology.

Christian wisdom

wisdom. Descartes,

on

"quite independently

Gilson writes: "What

expression of wisdom was
synthesis of revelation and human
other hand, developed his philosophy
his personal Christian conviction. "2*
supreme

was a

the

from

was new

with Descartes

was

his actual and

practical separation of philosophical wisdom and theological
wisdom. Whereas Thomas Aquinas distinguished in order to unite,
Descartes divided in order to separate. "25 Gilson goes

on to show that
believed
he
could
the
existence of God
wrongly
prove
whom philosophy had
"wholly separated from Christian theology
never been able to discover so long as it had remained
foreign to the

Descartes

.

.

.

influences of Christian revelation. "2^

Gilson further shows that Descartes' proof of God was not in fact a

pure natural theology despite his contention to the contrary. For
Descartes could never have affirmed so unmistakably the existence

of God had it not been for the influence of the Christian revelation

philosophy. Gilson
theology is one which, given
upon his

argues that the only successful natural
the revelation of God, proves that His

existence is necessary from a rational consideration of the
contingency (i.e., dependency) of the world. In principle, this natural

theology done in retrospect of God's revelation is arguable with nontheists as well, even though they may well not choose to accept it.
It is indeed surprising that protestant theology has so widely
accused Thomism of constructing a pure natural theology. As
Mascall points out, the textbook doctrine tends to be rigid in making
the distinction between the natural and the supernatural and has
been the basis in large part for this misunderstanding.27 Yet Thomist
philosophers have been insistent upon the mutuality of revelation
and reason in constructing a natural theology.
Presumably, the myth will continue to the misfortune of
protestant theology. Protestant thought has too long allowed itself to
be victimized by the subjectivism of Kantianism. The consequences
have been disastrous in many instances. Classical theological
liberalism and new-orthodoxy are two notable movements which
have had difficulty speaking biblically about God because of the
Kantian dictum that transcendent reality is incapable of being
known. Contemporary theology will continue to be fragmented into
24
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competing movements until the mutuality of revelation and reason is
once again recognized. Neo-Thomism can contribute to a
protestant
balance between revelation and reason, if the long-standing
prejudices and misunderstandings about natural theology can be laid
aside. Otherwise, protestant theology will continue to swing from
undue emphasis on reason (liberal theology and process theology) to
an undue emphasis on revelation
(neo-orthodoxy).
2. God
Hartshorne defines God

as

Dipolar

dipolar. The dipolar concepts include:
absolute-relative, existence-actuality, necessity-contingency,
perfection-imperfection, being-process, abstract-concrete, infinitefinite. The latter terms in these polarities are inclusive of the former
terms which play a subordinate role. Reality is thus made up of
ultimate contraries which are brought into harmony with each other
asymmetrically. While the terms in these polarities are inter
dependent, the latter are the constituent nature of reality. This is a
reversal of the theistic position which ascribes being priority over
process.
For Hartshorne's

as

process, relativity, actuality,
contingency, imperfection are interchangeable terms which are more
inclusive than the concepts of being, absolute, existence, necessity,
and perfection. He says that classical metaphysics with its
monopolar view began "the long tale of the metaphysical abuse of
Scripture" which dates back to Philo and culminated with
Augustine.28 Hartshorne believes his process philosophy which
makes God primarily relative instead of absolute now permits us to
rediscover the biblical God and the true meaning of worship.^'
Instead of a God who transcends the finite world, his concrete reality
is the actual world in its entirety. The dipolar concepts of existenceactuality illustrate this definition of God. He has both existence and
actuality. His existence denotes his abstract essence; His actuality
denotes the empirical exemplification of His abstract essence (i.e.,
existence).^! God's perfect existence is a mere conceptual abstrac
tion; it refers to the inexhaustible potentialities in God. His actuality
is the ongoing series of imperfect expressions of His perfect
existence. God's imperfect actuality is thus greater than (and
inclusive of) His perfect existence.
The metaphysical necessity of God's existence is that, given the
fact of the actuality of the world, one must posit necessary existence.

neo-theism,
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There

can be no
actuality without the corresponding necessity that
existence be conceived. Hartshorne sees this to be the true discovery
of Anselm's ontological argument. 32 The perfect being is one who

conceived not to exist. Anselm's mistake was to confuse
God's existence with His actuality. Instead of defining God's perfect
existence and imperfect actuality as dipolar, Anselm posited a split

cannot be

between

monopolar God and the world.^^
Another set of polarities is absolute-relative. He defines the
absolute as "unrelated. "34 Yov example, in the ordinary knowerknown

(e.g.,

a

relationship,

it is the knower who is related and the known

(unrelated). Theism supposedly turns
this around. God's perfection is that He is "unrelated" (absolute).
Hartshorne concludes that traditional theism really turns God into a
superobject rather than a supersubject. He is more like a superstone
than a superperson.^s Herein lies the inconsistency of theism. It
equates God's perfection with an absolute unsurpassability. While
our greatness is our ability to be related to other objects, God's
supposed greatness is His inability to be related to anything other
than Himself. Yet classical theism insists the world is related to God,
though God is not related to the world. What can be greater
a

stone)

that is absolute

"nonsense," he asks?^^
He could have been

more

helpful in his critique of theism if he had
concept of the absolute has

pointed

out the several ways the

position

of traditional theism. Since theism does not define the

thought. First, it may refer to what is
history
with
unrelated
Hartshorne). Second, the absolute
(as
completely
may refer to the all-inclusive reality (pantheism). Third, the absolute
may refer to the Supreme Intelligence whose existence is necessary
but nonetheless actual and who is the creative ground of everything
else which is contingent upon His necessary existence. This is the
functioned in the

absolute

as

of

does Hartshorne, there is here

no

logical contradiction.

3. God in Process
This

new

theism calls for

a

reorientation of God toward process

and openness to the future. Herein lies its difference from
which conceived God in terms of a monistic, static
whereas

panentheism (all-in-God)

stresses

the

pantheism
substance,

dipolar concepts of

reality.
A corollary to Hartshorne's panentheism is panpsychism. There is
not such thing as Wind matter. Nor is any aspect of the world without
26
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means

mutual interaction

interrelate.^s

there is a degree of chance inherent in the
behavior of the world. There are genuine alternatives in the world
which can be chosen freely without coercion. Freedom means to be
means

self-deciding

self-creating. 3' It reaches its greatest expression in
God who embraces the actuality of everything past and present, as
well as the abstract possibilities of everything future. The future of
the concrete God, however, is never settled. What God's actuality
will be is contingent upon the choices of all those present living
from the subatomic level to the
organisms contained in His reality
level
found
in
It can thus be seen why
humankind.
highest
Hartshorne says process is the fundamental concept of panentheism
rather than the notion of being. It can also be seen why he labels his
panentheism a surrelativism. God is Surrelative (i.e., the supremely
relative).*�
Hartshorne believes his quasi-theism is a more accurate reading of
Holy Scripture than traditional theism. In the light of its
insurmountable logical difficulties, Hartshorne thinks theists have
and

�

no

other alternative than to

worshiped,

adopt his proposal.*' If God is

to be

then God must be a God in process, not a static, unrelated

Monarchical-like

Being.

Hartshorne fails to

see

that process is also

a

fundamental idea in

metaphysics defined being in a
static manner, traditional theism, represented by Augustine and
Aquinas, did not. Aquinas redefined ultimate being as self-existing
(acting) being. Gilson shows that Aquinas defined existence as
dynamic activity (becoming). But God's becoming is not a finite
becoming in which God changes from one state to another. The
notion of activity is not identical in meaning to changing.
Hartshorne's metaphysics confuses these terms.
In his exposition of Karl Barth's doctrine of God, Eberhard
Jiingel shows that God's being is in becoming. But God's becoming
traditional theism. While Greek

does not

mean

God's eternal

Being.*2

finite movement in which God's existence is altered.
becoming is the motion of love within his truine

is Pure Act. Activity and energy within the
The biblical history of revelation
fundamental.
being
substantiates this affirmation that God is one who acts (cf G. Ernest
The God of

divine

Aquinas

are

Wright, The God Who Acts).
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A weakness of the

philosophy

Augustinian definition of God is the Platonic
of essentialism in which God is primary defined in terms

of ideas (essences) rather than concrete existence. While he certainly
affirmed the dynamic reality of God and thus radically modified the
Platonic notion of static substance, Augustine's reliance upon
essentialism worked against the biblical insight that God is

fundamentally

one

decisiveness.

who is

a

self-existing being

who acts with

Nevertheless, Augustine's substantialism

was modified by his
relational concept of God's triune being. As
Christopher Stead points out, Augustine's term for God was
"substantial relations. '"?^ Hence process in God is fundamental for
Augustine. God is Father by virtue of His dynamic relation to the

stress upon the

Son. The Son is Son

by virtue of his relation to the Father. The Holy
Spirit is the dynamic union of Father and Son. In this way,
Augustine affirms God's infinite being, while preserving His living,
dynamic reality.
The Eastern Church spoke of the divine procession. God is in
eternal process within Himself. The Father begets the Son, and the
Holy Spirit proceeds from Father and Son (as formulated by
Western Christianity). This notion of process is an infinite actual
process which does not involve an alteration in God's infinite being.
To be sure, finite process does involve change. But if God is an
infinite being who has actualized all possibilities, then process within
His divine reality does not imply finite changes.
Hartshorne's use of process harks back beyond the traditional
theism of Augustine and Aquinas to classical Greek philosophy in
which

essence

is

a

static notion. Hartshorne defines the

essence

of

ultimate reality as a mere abstract, logical notion which lacks
dynamic actuality. But if God is a personal Creator ex nihilo who is
"a pure Act of Existing," then the infinite process within His divine
being cannot be prejudged on the basis of our finite process.
Hartshorne's metaphysics suffers from his not discussing the issue of
process as formulated in traditional theism. He rather generally
states that theism is riddled with logical confusion because he
assumes that actuality always infers finiteness, while the concept of
being always infers static sameness.
While Greek thought defined being in static terms of substance,
Aquinas defined God's being in dynamic terms of existence ("pure
Act of Existing").** That is why R.G. CoUingwood says Aquinas
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the Greek notion of substance with his

Pure Act.*' This

is also why Gilson calls
philosophy as opposed to an essentialist
philosophy. Gilson writes that for Aquinas "existence is not a thing,
but the act that causes a thing both to be and to be what it is."*^
While Hartshorne is right to insist upon process in God, it is a non
sequitur that process necessarily involves finite changing. God's

Thomism

an

as

existential

existence is not

an abstraction, but is His freedom to act, even as
human existence is one's freedom to act. For humans, to exist is a

finite

becoming of one's true essence,

is identical to His

essence.

His

4. The
A fundamental

is His

ontological

whereas for God His existence

essence

Mystery

implication

is

a

pure Act of

Existing.

of God

of God's mystery in traditional theism

distinction from the created order of being. What

emerges from this polarity of God and the world, Hartshorne says, is
a third reality: "So it seems that the total reality is World-and-God, a

whole of which both creator and creatures
whole is neither God

is

given

are

constituents. This

world but a third entity of which no account

system" of traditional theism.*'
Hartshorne introduces an illicit meaning into the word, God, here.
One cannot add God and the world together because they are
different categories. God is not one more numerical finite entity
alongside which other entities in the created world can be added
together. The idea of a third entity, God-and-the-world, which would
be greater than either God or the world, is a logical impossibility for
a God who is infinite being, though it would be true of a finite God.
us

in the

nor

Corresponding to Hartshorne's denial of God's self-existence is his
rejection of creatio ex nihilo. He says this doctrine arises from a
"dubious interpretation" of an "obscure parable" in Genesis.*^
Though the Hebraic mindset was not metaphysically oriented, there
is no intrinsic reason why the Bible could not be restated in the new
cultural thought-patterns of Hellenism. In fact, this process was
already begun in the New Testament. It is curious that after
Hartshorne has blamed traditional theism for its "metaphysical
abuse" of Scripture that he appeals to the Bible for support of his
own process metaphysics, as if in his case the Bible does speak
metaphysically.*'
The doctrine of ex nihilo is implicit in the Bible. It became

normative in later Judaism. The first clear statement of creatio

ex
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nihilo is II Maccabees 7:28, but as Edmond Jacob says, this doctrine
"was the only possible issue [inference] from the thought of the Old

Testament, "50 As Yehezkel Kaufmann points out, in the Old
Testament "this principle is not yet made exphcit." He further writes:
"Yet the role of the tohu wabohu is

quite unlike the past played by the
primeval matter of pagan cosmogonies, God creates the cosmic
phenomena of light, firmament, sun, moon, and host of heaven by
fiat alone, with no recourse to primeval stuff,"" This doctrine
implicit in the Old Testament became normative in Judaism of Jesus'
day. It is echoed in certain New Testament passages as Romans 4: 17,
Hebrews 11:3, and II Peter 3:5, Hartshorne is out of step with the
of biblical scholars in this regard. Nor does his

consensus

panentheistic idea

have

truly biblical foundation. Kaufmann writes:

"The pagan idea that the deity derives power and benefit from certain
objects and substances is entirely absent in the Bible. "52
The thrust of Paul's argument to the men of Athens on the
Areopagus was the cosmological transcendence of God's being. In

polj^heistic inclusion of the gods within the world
altogether unlike the more sophisticated panentheism

contrast to the

(which is not
of Hartshorne),

Paul says:

The God who made the world and
man,

nor

gives
everything (Acts 17:24-25).

needed anything, since He Himself
breath and

everything

in

it, being

earth, does not live in shrines made by
is He served by human hands, as though He

Lord of heaven and

to all men life and

Kaufmann further writes of the Old Testament: "Theogony makes
the birth of the gods part of the eternal, self-operating process of

are subject to
becoming that governs the universe. Hence the gods
succession of ages." On the other hand, "the biblical god, however,
is outside of the flux of becoming and change. "53
For Hartshorne to contend otherwise is to go against wellestablished results of biblical exegesis. Hartshorne's panentheistic
reduction of God's being to finite process and relativity is a reverting
back to the paganism rejected by the Bible. Panentheism is turning
God the Creator into a naturalistic deity who is a creature (Romans
1:25). The God of the Bible is the living God of creation, the
sovereign Lord of history, and His nature is invisible and spiritual
(John 4:24; Romans 1:20). The inescapable conviction of the Bible is
...

a
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that God is

personal though distinct from His creation, and He enters
into relation with His creatures freely, while at the same time

maintaining

His separate, determinate individuality. Hartshorne's
neo-theism lacks an appreciation for this quality of mystery in God's

infinite

being.

5. The

Possibility of God-Talk

Hartshorne's finite God does not tell
because He lacks concrete

us

personality.

something about

Himself

He argues that the personal
God of traditional theism also could not talk to His creatures because

the idea of
to

an

infinite

the world.'*

being

would

The Christian theist chooses

a

logically exclude

His relatedness

different approach than Hartshorne's.

does the Bible preserve a balance between God's infinite
and
His revelation in history, philosophical considerations
mystery
substantiate that talk about an infinite God is a possibility.

Not

only

The basic

metaphysical

not a genus, but

being. Being as such is
everything as Aristotle

attribute of God is

it is what embraces

maintained. All God-talk in traditional theism presupposes that
being is fundamental both for God and humans. The classical
biblical text which illustrates this metaphysical conviction is in
Exodus 3:14, where God declares his name to Moses: "I am who I

am." The writer to the Hebrews also says the fundamental thing
about belief in God is "that He is" (Hebrews 11:6). The "I am"
statements of Jesus contained in John's

Gospel also reflect the "I am"

of Exodus 3:14.

Since being is not a finite category as such but a quality of all levels
of reality, traditional theism avoids the charge that its God is wholly
other. In this respect, the imago dei doctrine (Genesis 1:27) is a
fundamental premise for making theological assertions.

analogy of being is helpful here. One
can make assertions about God, but they are analogical. Since God
and humans are rational beings, communication can take place. But
since God is infinite being and humans are finite beings, we can only
understand what transcends our being analogically. Analogical
language is not equivocal since we do have being in common with
God, though unlike the divine being our being is dependent being.
Nor is analogical language univocal, for finite beings do not possess
being in exactly the same way the divine being does. Nonetheless,
The Thomist doctrine of the

finite

beings

can

know what the infinite

being

reveals in

a

positive
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way about Himself since there is a hierarchy of being in which finite
persons share being in common with God. Hence talk about God is a

rational

possibility.

Hartshorne may reject the notion of a complex hierarchical view
of reality. He may opt for a "one-storied" universe. He may require

reality should be talked about univocally and literally, but in so
doing, he obscures the spiritual uniqueness of human beings and the
that

transcendence of God.

6. God's Power and Evil
Hartshorne's God is not

for the

"why"

an

actual person who bears responsibility
a necessary implication of the

of creation.'' Evil is

freedom of the world, and God exercises persuasive
power in influencing (but not dictating) the world.'^

(not coercive)

allegedly unnecessarily burdened with an
understanding freedom and evil because it
problem
holds God responsible for creating ex nihilo and ascribes to Him a
"sheer monopoly" of power." Evil allegedly makes sense in
panentheism because the world is free of divine coercion and because
God is not the cause of things.'* If God is the metaphysical cause of
things, God's goodness is called into question.
The hidden premise in this ancient objection to theism is that
reality ought to be simple, but this is just where its inadequacy lies.
Reality is far more complex than atheism or panentheism will allow.
There are no easy answers in regard to the twistedness of the world.
the death of His
The sin of the world cost something also for God
Son. He could not simply whitewash the wrongs in the world. To do
so would be to undermine His own morality. Not even an allpowerful God who has created persons with moral freedom can act
capriciously, as if He had exclusive monopoly on power. But He can
act graciously and lovingly. This is the significance of the incarnation
the divine person, the God-man, took upon Himself the pain and
suffering of the world. The morality of God is vindicated, not by
some capricious act in which He simply overcame and overruled
finite freedom, but by His becoming finite in Jesus of Nazareth.
(Notice that becoming, process, is at the heart of the doctrine of the
incarnation).
To demand of God that He annihilate tragedy and sin if He is allpowerful is to misunderstand the meaning of divine power in
traditional theism. It is to make Him a capricious Superman who
Traditional theism is

insoluable

in

�

�
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defies the laws of His own moral being. For God to create persons
with finite freedom implies the possibility of choosing evil. Edward
Madden and Peter Hare in their classical treatment of the theistic

problem with evil have shown that some evil is logically compatible
with the notion of God's sovereignty and love. Their reservations
about theism are not based on a logical contradiction in theism, but
on

the

apparently gratuitous

tribution.'' Yet, is

not

possible implication

nature

of evil and its

unjust

dis

the extensive twistedness of the world

a

irresponsibility?
pain of the consequences of human
sin. Because of the interrelatedness and solidarity of humanity and
because of the intrinsic relatedness of humanity with nature, all
creation suffers evil as a result of human irresponsibility (Romans
8:18-23).
Unlike Hartshorne's view in which evil is largely explained away
since no personal God is responsible for creation as such, traditional
a
theism recognizes the tragedy of evil for what it really is
in
The
of
evil
is
its
of
human
choices.
wrong
tragedy
consequence
of moral

Paul

even

shows that

the entire creation travails in the

�

fundamental

sense

that it

was

for wrong choices to be
of wrong choices necessarily

not necessary

made (even though the possibility
coexisted with the fact of freedom). Because of the intrinsic
relatedness of humanity and creation, evil appears gratuitous and
unjust in its distribution in the sense that evil extensively blights the
whole world.

existing in the world. There is
not some hidden plan He has for the world in this regard. What we
view as tragedy is so for God. Ultimately, God will redeem the world
and tragedy will be overcome through our choices to accept His
redeemed humanity in Jesus Christ. This is why the eschatological
hope of the Christian is an essential part of his faith in God.
The doctrine of original sin assumes the gratuitous nature of evil.
But, as Mascall writes: "The doctrine of original sin is a cheerful
doctrine, for it assures us that the sad condition in which we find
ourselves is not the condition for which we are made and that by the
God had

no

ultimate

reason

for evil

grace of God we can be delivered from it."^
So radical is the Christian understanding of the terrible
of free will that it allows for the real possiblity that

imphcations
tragedy may

not be overcome

altogether.

It is

entirely possible

that

some through their moral rejection of God's grace may find
themselves eternally outside the Kingdom of God. It has been
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suggested that the highest compUment given to human beings by God
is to allow them to choose their eternal
destiny .^i
This concept of the eternal loss of the self seems difficult to accept.

We might well wonder why God made human beings
knowing in
advance the abuse to be made of freedom. Why would God create if
evil would become so gratuitous and terrible in its consequences?

There is

no reason

chooses to let

an

which

we as

infinite, wise

finite

beings

can

give.

The theist

God be God in this decision of His to

Of course the believer affirms that God's will is in accord with
rationaUty and morality. Yet it will not help in the final analysis to
argue with Leibniz that this is the best of all possible worlds. This is
create.

his

simply the world God freely choose to create. To demand that we
fully know the reasons why God created is existentially under
standable, but philosophically unproductive. Is the gratuitous nature
of evil worth the price of creation? God thinks so, even if we think
not.

Nontheists may think this insoluble problem makes theism
unacceptable, but the theist is still free to argue that nontheists do not
make the problem of evil any more palatable (especially since they
offer no hope for deliverance). Nor do they offer alternatives which
escape any less serious logical and existential difficulties, especially
it

as

can

be

seen

in the self-contradiction of the nontheist's

assumption that there is no moral reason for things existing while
morally arguing against the immorality of the world. One cannot
simultaneously argue against the idea of the ultimate morality of the
world while assuming the objectivity of his own moral insight. If
there is no moral reason inherent in the being of the world, there can
be no persuasiveness to the particularistic judgment of a nontheist
who claims he possesses moral insight into why God cannot exist.
The nontheist cannot have it both ways. If there is no inherent moral
reason to the being of the world, then he should be unable to see any

regard to evil. A problem of evil is a problem for
theist, but the nontheist from the outset has excluded
himself from even discussing the issue by the nature of his own

problem

at

all with

the traditional

postulates.

A similar

a

difficulty obtains for panentheism.

moral and rational structure inherent in the

Hartshorne

assumes

world, but he denies

there is any moral reason why there is anything at all. Morality is an
irrational given; it is altogether unaccounted for. Especially God is
not
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rationality itself then morality
rationality
indistinguishable from arbitrariness. Moral
reasoning is simply reduced to individual caprice, and any attempt to
construct meaning and value is illicit from the outset.
Even if there is a real element of chance (arbitrariness) in reality
(the Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy), the scientist and the
philosopher still assume the priority of rational structure over
arbitrariness. Unless reality is predictable in accord with reason, then
life will be disrupted and all theoretical constructs will collapse. For
truth depends upon the principle of rational explanation. Yet how
can one explain the principle of rationality itself? If we assume
reasons can be given for everything (even to acknowledge irrational
behavior depends on rational insight), then are we not compelled to
assume that finite rationality itself must be accounted for?
Hartshorne says not. He makes contingency the basis of everything.62 Hence the self-cancellation of his panentheism. He has no
apparent theoretical basis upon which to construct any theory of
truth or morality, if irrational causes account for the being of the
world. How there can be any logical reasoning at all if there is no
ultimate reason why there is something rather than sheer nothing is
not explained. Whitehead's labeling this difficulty "the ultimate
limitation" and "the ultimate irrationality"^^ indicates the
panentheistic failure to account for the validity of logical thinking.
These labels do not theoretically justify logical reasoning any more
than does Bertrand Russell's nontheistic attempt to justify belief in
inductive reasoning through what he calls "induction by enumera
tion." He frankly admits that how one can justify the validity of
reasoning "remains unsolved to this day."^* The theist is able to see in
and

no

are

these concessions traces of sheer fideism.
The panentheistic insight that God's existence is the

principle of
with
God's
actuality
equating
rationality
for
reason
If
the
anything concretely existing is
contingency.
what
irrational, then upon
philosophical basis can reason be relied
other than blind faith? Irrationality and rationality
upon at all
become indistinguishable.
It seems apparent that the nontheistic and panentheistic objection
to belief in a personal self-existent Being, who is all-powerful and
good, is too easy. For there can be no true moral reasoning without
the presuppositions of traditional theism which provides the only
basis for assuming the validity of rationality and morality, as the
is thus weakened

by

its

�

35

The

Asbury

Seminarian

Thomist tradition has always maintained. While evil may be an
insoluble problem for the theist, the more fundamental problem of

reasoning at all is an insoluble problem for the nontheist and
panentheist. What is metaphysically needed, as Kant put it, is a
Supreme Intelligence who alone can "render the existence of the
contingent
comprehensible. "^5 Otherwise, one falls into "the
narrowing assertions of materialism, of naturalism, and of
.

.

.

fatalism. "^6

Though

the theistic

in God does enable
of

gratuitous

position

one

to

evil and its

poses a problem for itself, one's faith
face the future with hope, even if the "why"

unjust distribution cannot be silenced. The
hope grounded in the fact of the sufferings of God in
Christ. To be sure, Hartshorne also speaks of God suffering. If God
lacks a conscious, subjective awareness of emotions, there is little
comfort in the panentheistic identification of God with the world.
reason

for this

is

God in Christian theism suffers in Jesus Christ. God is affectional in

being, and because He is an infmite, intelligent Being, the
intensity of His pain surpasses all Umits of human anguish. This
notion of a hurting God who has suffered in Jesus Christ shows the
extent of His emotional involvement with creation. His suffering is a
testimony that God is doing everything that an all-loving, allpowerful God can do to save the world, given the context of human
freedom and morality.^'
To be sure, God's perfect being is not altered through His openness
to the world and His emotional involvement with us. Yet God is truly
affectionate and is consciously aware of His and our emotions. The
error of Patripassianism is not that it taught that God's being
included pathos, but that God was capable of being changed in His
essence by finite persons. The idea of impassibility in traditional
theism in this regard is misleading for us today since passion no
longer means being acted upon and changed. Passion for us denotes
His

the idea of emotional involvement.

7.
The basic

Reality

as

Personal

philosophical objection to Hartshorne's process
metaphysics
de-personalizes reality. His conception of the
world harks back to the early Greeks, such as Empedocles, who
describes the essence of the world as love (attraction) and hate
(strife).^^ Love and hate are metaphysical abstract essences, not
characteristics of free intelligences. That is, love is not primarily
is that it
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subjective knowledge of one's emotions,
principle.
Hartshorne defines love as "sympathetic participation." That is,
the actual world is the sympathetic (i.e., interdependent) participa
tion of all its parts in each other.^' Love is not primarily an affective
relationship between intelligent persons, but is rather a mutual
association of the particulars of reality. Love is more of a principle
than a personal response.
Freedom is de-personalized in its primary signification and re
interpreted as a cosmological principle of chance inherent in all
reality from the molecular level up to the actual whole of the world.
To be sure, it is not sheer chance for Hartshorne, but the principle of
indeterminacy is where his emphasis lies.'�
Knowledge is also de-personalized in the primary sense of the
word to mean ontological relatedness, not critical reflection.'' He
if not some kind of
asks: "What is concrete knowledge
or
love?"'^
Love, knowledge, sympathetic
sympathetic participation
participation are more or less interchangeable terms to designate an
impersonal principle of interdependence, mutual association, and
but is

an

a

conscious

abstract

...

inclusiveness.

The concept of

awareness

is also

de-personalized.

"Awareness is

Also, "personality"
adaptation
essentially response,
is de-personalized. "And what is 'personality' but an enduring
individual character or essence in a flux of such responses?"'*
Personality means the "character" of God (i.e.. His abstract essence).
an

a

It refers to "the

mere

to others. "^^

universal divine outline of existence without

particular content" and as such "is indeed empty.""
Personality denotes primarily the social relations of all concrete
entities. Personality thus no longer carries with it a common sense
definition of meaning an individual rational being.'^
concrete or

the "act" of God. To say God acts is to say he
This responsiveness in God is the primary feature of the

Awareness

"responds."

means

relative, concrete aspect of God. "Personality" is the primary feature
of the absolute, non-actual aspect of his reality. It is the personality
of God which is metaphysically, eternally enduring, but it is His

empirically changing. Personality is only a
metaphysical abstraction, lacking actual intelligence. Awareness
means the empirical relatedness of everything. It specifically has no
connotation of psychological self-awareness which is a characteristic
of determinate beings with intelligence.
awareness

that is
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What Hartshorne is asking us to see is that every part of reality
from the molecular level up to the actual whole of reality (God-andthe world) is self-deciding, knowing, loving, responding, while

stripping
meanings.

all these terms of their commonsense, personalistic
In this respect, Hartshorne has more aptly called his

panentheism

a

neo-Buddhism.''

His neo-Buddhism is further

beings
Here

as

seen in the way he defines human
who lack any enduring self-identity.
close to the notion of absolute change, that nothing

changing individuals

we come

endures except that the present does somehow include the past,
though what is present is not the past reality as such. The only

enduring

is the specious present.'^
possible to defend this notion of absolute change
which nothing endures? Paul Tillich has shown the inadequacy
event

How is it

in
of

this idea:

The first

thing to be emphasized is that human nature could
change if there was not something unchangeable in it.
This is easy to understand: absolute change is an impossible
notion, because without a subject of which we can say that it
changes we neither could notice nor measure a change.''
not

telling criticism of his process
falling into Eleaticism
metaphysics.
because he makes being, not process, the key ontological concept.*"
For Hartshorne, only love impersonally conceived as the dynamic
interrelation of all things is the enduring quality of reality. God is the
greatest exemplification of love, for he is the integration of all
actualities, though he undergoes a "multiplicity of states."
Hartshorne says this means the God I "worship" is not your God.
Neither do I worship the same God now that I did a moment ago.*'
Why? Because He is always changing in His actuality, though His
love (i.e., that quality which binds reality together) guarantees the
unity and harmony of the world. The Christian theists might be led to
think this notion of many "gods" is only a more sophisticated form of
polytheism.
It is apparent that love in its primary signification does not mean a
Hartshorne refuses the force of this
He in turn

accuses

Tillich of

self-conscious emotion between persons. To be sure, Hartshorne
only men worship (i.e., praise God) because he alone has

does say

intelligence enough to speak. *2 But what does it mean to praise God if
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determinate

knowledge of our acts of worship? Worship is
verbal response on our part to something
which cannot know what we are saying.
According to its commonsense meaning, to be a person is to be a
determinate being with free intelligence. Hartshorne denies that God
is a person in the sense of "a single determinate actuality.
He is a
person in the analogical sense that he, like men, is a unified and
integrated being.** His difference from us is that he is "absolutely
cosmic or universal in his capacities interacting with all others."*'
Hartshorne rejects what he calls a "substance theory of personality"
in favor of "the Buddhist-Whiteheadean or event theory" according
to which "an existing person [whether divine or human] is a sequence
of actualities, several per second presumably."*^
For Christian theism, this is the fatal flaw in Hartshorne's
panentheism. What sense does it make to say that reality is a process
actualizing its meaning if reahty is de-personalized? What sense can
be made of a panpsychist contention that atoms strive, decide, create,
love, know, if they are devoid of free intelligence?*' Are not such
qualities exclusively the possession of determinate beings with
inteUigence? Even allowing for the quantum theory of physics which
says there is chance in the very structure of reality, there is no reason
why we should anthropomorphize atoms. Even though Hartshorne
claims his panpsychist metaphysics is the most intelligible
alternative, it is difficult to avoid the impression that it is an
abstraction unrelated to real life, especially because it de
personalizes reality.
Herein lies the most glaring parodox in his thought. The concrete
God is the all-embracing actuality, but for whom is the concrete God
an actuality? For Himself? No, because He is not a je(/"-conscious
living mind who has a determinate knowledge of Himself For man?
no

de-personaUzed

to mean a

no way any person can embrace in the mind the
whole of reality. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion

No, because there is

comprehensive

that Hartshorne's concrete God is

an

abstraction. A

commonsense

think of ideas as belonging to a
concept of personality requires
living self-conscious mind. Values are nothing if they do not belong
to someone. Hartshorne implicitly admits this when he acknowledges
us

to

that the concrete God after man's disappearance from the world may
include everything "faintly and ineffectively."** Why? Because God's

existence is not

an

"values" within the

intelligent being. To locate "ideas" and
empirical world apart from any association with
actual
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actual intelligence is finally to
de-personalize the meaning of ideas
and values. In his criticism of
humanism, Hartshorne rejects this
exclusiveness of values to rational beings as a deification of
humanity.*' But it seems his thought has fallen into the opposite
an

error

of

anthropomorphizing

the world.

Hartshorne's reduction of reality to the relative world leads to a
further reservation about his panentheism. He seems to have no
vision of mystery. There is no allowance in his system for what Tillich
calls the

abysmal nature of reality, or what Michael Novak calls the
experience of nothingness.'" Hartshorne's rationalistic emphasis
upon the meaningfulness of reality ignores the gnawing suspicion
that there is an unknowable element about ultimate
reality which
engulfs us and threatens us. Tillich's panentheism interprets this
abysmal nature of reality as the unknowable depth of reality which
points to the unchangeableness of God as Being-itself " Existen
tialists, like Sartre and Camus, interpret this feeling of nothingness as
an ontological vacuum in man's
being. For them, nothingness is
unknowable because nothing is there to be known. Hartshorne has
no place in his philosophy for this experience of
non-being. There is
also a corresponding neglect in his panentheism concerning the
feeling of anxiety and ambiguity of life. To say that the "essence of
God is philosophically explicable and knowable"'^ is to say nothing
is left unexplained about ultimate reality. If one knows the very
essence of God, then one is not estranged from God. There is then no
divine mystery, no grace, no sin, and that feeling of twistedness of the
world and the threat of the Unknown are simply explained away.
It becomes easy to see why Hartshorne disallows subjective
immortality.'^ His philosophy remains within the ordinary view of
human experience with no properties lying outside. There is nothing
more to reality. This emphasis upon the
universality of truth has the
advantage of claiming objectivity for itself, but it has the
disadvantage of undermining the significance of the individual with
his passionate interest in eternal happiness which transcends the
specious present. It can thus be said Hartshorne has de-personalized
immortality, for "we are ephemeral, but immortally so, for nothing
escapes being woven into the imperishable and living texture of
deity.""* Hartshorne objects to the charge this makes the concept of
immortality "impersonal."" He asks: "What is personal if not an
actual human life from birth to death? It is that which is everlastingly

cherished. "'6 But what
40
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determinate intelligence "cherishes" our life from its birth to
death in His eternal life? And is not the notion of an individual who is
no

"cherished" forever

meaningless

at least

for the

individual, if he

has

subjective
Kierkegaard's criticism of the HegeUan "concrete universal" seems
applicable to Hartshorne: "What happens to the individual is in the
last analysis a matter of indifference. "9'
existence in the hfe hereafter?

no

8. Hartshorne's Panentheism and Christian

Obviously

many of Hartshorne's

Theology

overlap with Christian
faith, and some Christian theologians believe his categories are easily
adapted theologically for interpreting the gospel to the contem
porary mind. Most notably among those who think this way is
Hartshorne's former student and distinguished professor at
Claremont School of Theology, John. B. Cobb, Jr. Whether or not
his attempt to provide this synthesis is successful merits considera
tion, but a full discussion of this question lies outside the scope of this
concerns

present essay.
However, Cobb's adaptation of process philosophy to Christian
faith is suspect from the beginning for several reasons, if finite

posited as the fundamental feature of God's actuality.
give us no "absolute" or "provisional" guarantee that
will
good
triumph over evil,'* despite Jesus' promise of the coming
Kingdom. If God is subject to finite process, then He too can be
victimized by evil and cannot promise us with certainty the arrival of
process is
First, God

can

the New Jerusalem.

Second, Cobb, unlike Hartshorne, does allow for the possibility of
life hereafter, though he is unsure about its reality and is not overly
concerned about it." His ambivalence stems in part from the
panentheistic denial that persons possess enduring spiritual self-

identity.

Human

come to an

beings

about this. If we

are

sequence of momentary events who
physical death. Paul thought differently

are a

end at their

imprisoned in the finite process with no spiritual

hope beyond this present world, Paul felt
life was meaningless here and now. Without the eschatological hope,
preaching is pointless, faith is empty, and existence is regrettable (I
Cor. 15:14, 19).
Third, God's reduction to finite process calls into question His
deity. Unlike Hartshorne, Cobb's Christian convictions cause him to
ascribe personal self-awareness to God.'"" Yet His self-awareness is
transcendence and with

no
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limited by the finite process. Particularly, God does not know the
future. If God is a self-knowing mind who does not transcend the
relativities of this worldly process and who has no comprehensive

knowledge

of future

reality, then one cannot help but wonder if God
insecurity and anxiety of this Unknown Future,
What is to keep us from thinking God "deifies" this Unknown even as
man's anxiety about the future has been the occasion for his
"anthropomorphizing" his experience of the Unknown? Despite his
impersonal notion of being, Tillich's criticism of Bergson's process
thought seems incontrovertible at this point.
does not feel the

anticipate every possible future is
absolute accident and cannot be the

A God who is not able to

dependent

on

an

foundation of an ultimate courage. This God would Himself
be

subject

to the

anxiety

of the unknown,

.

,

,

On the other

hand, without that which limits openness, history would be

without direction. It would

cease

to be

history, 'O'

reality can be
impossible to know. For it gives
us no security about the triumph of good over evil; it minimizes the
significance of the eternal happiness of individuals; and it weakens
faith ("ultimate courage") in God since He Himself is "subject to the
anxiety of the unknown."
The religious implications of Hartshorne's metaphysics are in
many respects negative from the standpoint of traditional theism, as
Hartshorne intended. It denies otherworldly realities. It denies the
history of salvation. It denies the special revelation of ultimate reality
(a personal God) in history. It denies that anything absolutely unique
'"^
it is a
can happen in history. It is a denial of the Incarnation.
for
the
Bible
can
of
the
of
the
normative
Bible,
authority
rejection
teach us nothing about the essence of anything which is not already
exemplified in ordinary human experience.'"* The Bible as a record
of God speaking and acting in history is decided against in favor of a
philosophy which stresses universal principles for "which factual
distinctions are neutral."'"' Nothing historically factual is then of any
consequence to Hartshorne's quasi-theism. Hartshorne's metaphysics
minimizes the significance of the affectional nature of truth, as if the
conscious subjective awareness of human emotion is not the core of
personality. Hence worship of God as personal devotion is deHow finite process

as

the basic attribute of

harmonized with Christian faith is
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personalized into an aesthetic, intellectual exercise. Lacking the
personal dimension, Hartshorne's theism has more aptly been called
a quasi-theism.'"^
Yet Hartshorne impressively shows that a positivistic narrowing
down of truth to mere empirical facts is a retreating from the
philosophical responsibility of addressing reality as such. He
demonstrates that human experience cannot successfully evade the
fact of God's existence. He rightly contends that any meaningful
notion of God includes His involvement in time and that His

relationship to the world is grounded in the fact of divine energy and
activity. He rightly argues against a deterministic model of reality,
showing that freedom is a characteristic of the world because it is a
fundamental attribute of God. His rejection of a Kantian bifurcated
world in which only the appearance (phenomena) of reality
(noumena) is knowable is a move in the right direction if a wholistic
perspective of reality is to be maintained. Over against atheism,
humanism, and deism, Hartshorne seeks to show that the values
give meaning to the whole of creation are grounded in the

which

activity of God's concrete actuality. Whether or not his
quasi-theism is more adequate than traditional theism for
interpreting reality is a decision each person must make for oneself.
For truth, though it is an intellectual activity, is a moral decision.
immanent
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